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Abstract 
‘Net Neutrality’ is a very heated and contested United States policy principle 
regarding access for content providers to the Internet end-user, and potential 
discrimination in that access where the end-user’s ISP (or another ISP) blocks that 
access in part or whole. The suggestion is that the problem can be resolved by either 
introducing greater competition, as for instance in certain Western European nations 
under the Telecoms Framework 2002 (as proposed for amendment 2007), or closely 
policing conditions for vertically integrated service, such as VOIP. This assumes that 
competition in the ‘local loop’ or ‘last mile’ to the end-user subscriber provides a 
choice of platform, and therefore rigorous telecoms competition regulation resolves 
the issue in Europe. However, that may not be the whole story. The question this 
paper aims to answer is: Are Internet Service Providers motivated to require content 
providers to pay for superior service via lower levels of service for the same price 
(e.g. blocking or “throttling” content) or higher price for higher Quality of Service? 
Can abusive discrimination take place even where an ISP does not have dominance? I 
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consider market developments and policy responses in Europe and the United States, 
conclusions and regulatory recommendations. 
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1. Introduction 
‘Net Neutrality’ is a very heated and contested United States policy principle 
regarding access for content providers to the Internet end-user, and potential 
discrimination in that access where the end-user’s ISP (or another ISP) blocks that 
access in part or whole.1 Net neutrality has been variously defined, most prominently 
by regard to its forerunner “open access” by legal theorists Lemley and Lessig,2 and 
the term ‘Network Neutrality’ was first used by Wu.3 However, net neutrality’s 
definition is contested and I unpack the definition in the following section. The 
suggestion is that the problem can be resolved by either introducing greater 
competition, as for instance in certain Western European nations under the Telecoms 
Framework 20024 (as proposed for amendment 2007), or closely policing conditions 
for vertically integrated service, such as VOIP. 
This assumes that competition in the ‘local loop’ or ‘last mile’ to the end-user 
subscriber provides a choice of platform, and therefore rigorous telecoms competition 
regulation resolves the issue in Europe. However, that may not be the whole story. 
The question this paper aims to answer is: Are Internet Service Providers (ISPs) 
motivated to require content providers to pay for superior service via lower levels of 
service for the same price (e.g. blocking or “throttling” content) or higher price for 
higher Quality of Service (QoS)? Can abusive discrimination take place even where 
an ISP does not have dominance? I consider market developments and policy 
responses in Europe and the United States, conclusions and regulatory 
recommendations. By ‘Internet content’, I refer to content accessible to the general 
consumer on the public Internet,5 as opposed to secure private networks.6  
To reiterate the standard analysis, abusive discrimination in access to networks is 
usually characterised in telecoms as a monopoly problem, manifested where one or 
two ISPs have dominance typically in the “last mile” of access for end-users. The 
classic regulatory action to prevent blocking of access was the decision, by the US 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC), to enforce non-discrimination against a 
small ISP that had been blocking Voice over Internet Protocol (VOIP) service 
(Madison River Communications).7 ISPs can discriminate against all content, or 
                                               
1
 Often subject to special conditions (financial recompense or other types of payment). 
2
 M A Lemley and L Lessig “The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the 
Broadband Era” (2001) 48 University of California at Los Angles Law Review, 925.  
3
 T Wu (2003) “Network Neutrality and Broadband Discrimination” (2003) 2 Journal of 
Telecommunications and High Technology Law, at 141. 
4
 The telecoms framework consists of five Directives, implemented in Member States in 2003, and 
reviewed on a process that began in 2006 and may conclude in 2008: see 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/tomorrow/roadmap/index_en.htm 
5
 See K L Trope, “Voice Over Internet Protocol: The Revolution in America’s Telecommunications 
Infrastructure” (2005) 22(1) 12 Computers & Internet Law, 1,4. for definitions. 
6
 See OECD (2006) “Next Generation Networks: Evolution and Policy Considerations”, 3 October 
2006 at http://www.oecd.org/document/12/0,2340,en_2649_34223_37392780_1_1_1_1,00.html  
7
 Madison River Communications, LLC, Order, DA 05-543, 20 FCC Rcd 4295 (2005), available at: 
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-05-543A1.pdf  
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against the particular content that they compete with, where they are vertically 
integrated. Hahn and Wallsten explain:  
“net neutrality has no widely accepted precise definition, but 
usually means that broadband service providers charge consumers 
only once for Internet access, don’t favor one content provider over 
another, and don’t charge content providers for sending 
information over broadband lines to end users.”8 
Frieden, whose perspective is analytical and consumer-centric, reflects where 
regulators’ perspectives need by law to be focused.9 He summarises: 
“Network neutrality advocates worry that major ISPs have both the 
wherewithal and incentive to bifurcate the Internet into one medium 
increasingly prone to congestion and declining reliability and one 
offering superior performance and potential competitive advantages 
to users able and willing to pay, or affiliated with an ISP operating 
a major bitstream transmission network”. 
I agree that this is the focus of the problem: network owners with vertical integration 
into content or alliances have enhanced incentives to require content owners (who 
may also be consumers) to pay a toll to use the higher speed networks that they offer 
to end-users. In European debate, the issue has been dismissed by many as an 
“American problem” caused by the abandonment of Local Loop Unbundling (LLU) 
regulation for broadband competition in the local access network. The European 
Commission has proposed a more sophisticated approach in its review of the 
Regulatory Framework, adding interoperability and minimal service quality 
requirements to the interconnection requirements.10 The i2010 High Level Group 
stated: 
“The ‘net neutrality’ debate in the USA highlights operators’ 
propensity to enter into preferential distribution arrangements with 
some content providers … [this] may be problematic and the issue 
needs to be subject to wider discussions.”11 
In the 29 December 2006 merger of AT&T and BellSouth, the merged company 
undertook various commitments not to block other companies’ applications directed 
                                               
8
 R Hahn and S Wallsten “The Economics of Net Neutrality” (Washington, DC: AEI Brookings Joint 
Center for Regulatory Studies, April 2006). www.aeibrookings.org/publications/abstract.php?pid=1067  
9
 R Frieden (2006) “Internet 3.0: Identifying Problems and Solutions to the Network Neutrality 
Debate” at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=962181>http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?ab
stract_id=962181   
10
 See European Commission (2006) “Staff Working Document,” 28 June, at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/avpolicy/reg/tvwf/modernisation/consultation_2005/index_en.htm, at section 
6.4, Net Neutrality. 
11
 i2010 High Level Group (2006) The challenges of convergence: draft discussion paper, at 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/i2010/i2010_high_level_group/index_en.htm  
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over the Internet connection provided by the merged company. This consent was 
extracted by a majority in the FCC.12 AT&T agreed to:  
• follow the FCC’s four Network Freedoms13 for thirty months; 
• apply network neutrality principles for its broadband ISP between subscribers and 
the first Internet exchange point for a period of two years; 
• BUT it expressly reserved the option not to apply network neutrality principles for 
its Internet Protocol Television (“IPTV”) service, and to any service beyond the 
first Internet Exchange point.  
Note from the description of the first Internet Exchange or ‘handover’ point that, 
though discrimination is typically characterised as behaviour by “last mile” consumer 
ISPs against content providers (CPs), it can equally be undertaken at peering points by 
third parties.14 I note that such discrimination may possibly be detected by the end-
user when it is conducted by its ISP, while a far more pernicious and potentially 
undetectable discrimination may occur at peering points.15 Conventional US 
economic arguments appear to be broadly negative to the concept of net neutrality.16 
Net Neutrality has been the subject of legislative proposals in the Congress in 2006.17 
Werbach, Lehr and others are currently attempting to redefine Net Neutrality in terms 
of interconnection and other inter-carrier requirements, rather than end-user centred 
policy.18 
                                               
12
 See Freiden (2007), citing AT&T/Bell South (2006) and the dissent of the Chair of the FCC: 
“Importantly, however, while the Democrat Commissioners may have extracted concessions from 
AT&T, they in no way bind future Commission action. Specifically, a minority of Commissioners 
cannot alter Commission precedent or bind future Commission decisions, policies, actions, or rules … 
To the extent Commission action is required to effectuate these [concessions] as a policy going 
forward, we specifically do not support those aspects of the conditions and will oppose such policies 
going forward.” 
13
 Michael K Powell (2004) February 8, Speech at Symposium on “The Digital Broadband Migration: 
Toward a Regulatory Regime for the Internet Age” held at the University of Colorado School of Law. 
“I challenge the broadband network industry to preserve the following Internet Freedoms”: Freedom to 
Access Content; Freedom to Use Applications; Freedom to Attach Personal Devices; Freedom to 
Obtain Service Plan Information. See http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-
243556A1.pdf  
14
 See D Clark “Net neutrality” Keynote speech, Telecommunications Policy Research Conference, 
GMU Law School, Alexandira, Virgina, 28 September 2006, and M Sirbu “What is the Network 
Neutrality debate about?” presentation at conference A Workshop on Network Neutrality: American 
and European Perspectives, Paris, 29 May 2007, for technical possibilities in network architecture. 
15
 The debate in regard to the subtleties of service degradation is beyond this paper and experts at the 
Paris conference of 29 May 2007 were divided as to whether degradation that is deliberate could be 
well enough disguised to suggest off-net discrimination. 
16
 See G Woroch, “Open Access Rules and Equilibrium Broadband Deployment” in Cooper and 
Madden (eds), Frontiers of Broadband, Electronic and Mobile Commerce, Springer 2006, and A 
Thierer “Net Neutrality: Digital Discrimination or Regulatory Gamesmanship in Cyberspace?” (2004) 
Policy Analysis 507. 
17
 Communications, Consumer’s Choice, and Broadband Deployment Act of 2006, at: 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:SN02686:@@@L&summ2=m&  
18
 Work-in-progress papers presented in autumn 2006 at TPRC and Wharton Colloquia. 
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I briefly introduce the types of discrimination that may occur, issues of QoS, user-
generated and/or distributed content, and broadband supply and investment in the 
following sections. 
2. Types of content discrimination 
I suggest the following types of discrimination might constitute the type of “non-
neutral” behaviour by ISPs that may be found to be harmful to consumer welfare: 
non-transparency and misleading advertising, “throttling” or blocking, charging, 
certain types of more extreme and anti-competitive “walled gardens.”19 
2.1 Transparency failures 
ISPs may fail to tell customers and application developers which services they offer –
estimated bandwidth, latency, etc. This is essential to certain applications, which 
cannot run with latency, or which are blocked or filtered. Even where there is 
regulatory commitment to enforce Net Neutrality, the evidential problem remains. 
Van Schewick20 has recently suggested that the main problems currently lie in mobile 
networks, where VOIP is routinely degraded or blocked.21 The problem here is that 
certain users are breaching their terms of use but being insufficiently or non-
transparently sanctioned, and certain programmes are being throttled but the same 
applies. Often a security justification22 is used and is often unchallenged by 
regulators.  
2.2 Blocking and traffic shaping  
Blocking or “throttling” is the furthest deviation from neutrality. Some economists 
think it justified, but the basic problem is a distortion of competition between the 
blocked and unblocked companies. For example, a company serving online gaming 
content from South Korea may typically choose to do so via P2P networks, whereas 
an American CP might use a premium service sanctioned by the ISP of the end-user. 
Not only is the South Korean CP discriminated against, but neither end-user nor CP 
may be aware of the nature of the problem.23 This creates confusion amongst users as 
                                               
19
 With walls sufficiently high that one might term them “Forbidden Cities”. The reference is to the 
Chinese Emperor’s official residence in Peking until 1924, and I acknowledge fully the analogy to the 
‘Great Firewall of China’ – on which see J Zittrain and B Edelman, “Internet Filtering in China, Los 
Alamitos” (2003) CA : IEEE Computer Society Publications Office, and J Goldsmith and T Wu, Who 
Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless World, Oxford University Press, Oxford (2006). 
20
 B Van Schewick, “Towards an Economic Framework for Network Neutrality Regulation” paper 
presented at The 33rd Research Conference on Communication, Information and Internet Policy 
(TPRC 2005). 
21
 Kocsis and De Bijl have proposed a game theoretical perspective to analyze such incentives similar 
to the Appendix in Marsden 2006. Kocsis, Viktória and P W J de Bijl, “Network neutrality and the 
nature of competition between network operators”, TILEC Working paper September 2006. 
22
 P2P networks carry malware, spyware, spam and other unsolicited and potentially harmful content. 
23
 T Greenberg and A Veytsel, “Every Time You Vote against Net Neutrality, Your ISP Kills a Night 
Elf” (November 2006) at http://www.ramprate.com/marketcommentary/neutrality.html 
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to whether and how content is “throttled”. Certain types of traffic that are highly 
valued by the end-user of the Internet can be discriminated against in whole or in part 
by service providers that are not dominant. This is because they either have good 
competitive or good traffic management reasons to do so – it makes their networks 
safer and more efficient, making it complicated to work out when their discrimination 
is motivated by arguably less benevolent factors, like blocking the competition. There 
can be motives to throttle content no matter what ISP is discussed, and that behaviour 
is potentially anti-competitive. Future networks may try to cap P2P more effectively, 
which can itself lead to an “arms race” between encrypted P2P content and attempts 
by ISPs to detect P2P traffic. This is an example of how a baseline of traffic and usage 
would help the regulator to understand the importance of claims made by 
stakeholders. 
2.3 Termination fees for content providers 
Since broadband ISPs have a termination monopoly or duopoly24 over the end-user, 
they can use that to charge termination fees to those who wish to get access to the 
user. This behaviour is familiar to the cable TV industry, where only large CPs can 
secure free or even profitable carriage, whereas smaller CPs with less contracting 
power are forced to pay the cable TV operator for access. The fear is that a similar 
model will be imposed on the Internet, where only large CPs with sufficient 
negotiating power, and those with political influence to secure favourable carriage 
terms, will secure free carriage. The argument in Europe is particularly pernicious 
because public service broadcasting (PSB) occupies a position of strong bargaining 
power with legislatures and regulators. The argument can therefore be characterised 
as: will Net Neutrality apply only to PSBs, or to other/all content providers? We 
consider a different set of CP preferential treatments below. 
2.4 “Walled gardens” or preferred partners 
Carriers can offer exclusive, preferential treatment to one application provider over 
others, creating a type of “walled garden” of preferred suppliers. This is less distorting 
than blocking, depending on the type of walled garden and the ‘height of the walls’. I 
can differentiate “walled gardens” from an open/interoperable access “commons.”25 A 
“walled garden” is a type of IP content service offered without access to the wider 
Internet: for instance, most mobile telephone networks provided walled gardens to 
their subscribers. This has wider regulatory implications, involving the development 
of “gatekeepers” rather than open access models.26 Take an example: Mobile users 
                                               
24
 As there is usually only a telephone line, and sometimes a cable line (depending on cable industry 
development), into each domestic household, there are only two possible competitors unless one or 
both lines are shared with other rivals. 
25
 This is a well-developed distinction discussed at length in our previous report for Ofcom (Marsden, 
2006). By ‘commons’, we refer to an open space, with interoperable and publicly available standards, 
of which the World Wide Web is the archetype. 
26
 Continuing the analogy with commons and walled gardens, one can imagine that a walled garden can 
be protected and entry or exit charges imposed. By contrast a commons is open access, with no 
controls. The walled garden gatekeeper is likely to be the owner of the garden – the operator. ‘Walled 
gardens’ have historically described content or services bundled by an access provider as a package 
with fixed or mobile Internet access. The content is usually supplied under contract by content/services 
(2007) 4:4 SCRIPT-ed 
 
 
414 
inhabit a much more personal and pervasive environment than fixed Internet users. 
Compared to fixed line Internet access there are additional constraints on full 
openness. The mobile industry has developed hitherto on the basis that operators 
control the use of their networks and the devices which connect to them. For that 
reason, the initial content offerings of mobile providers have tended to be provided in 
a “walled garden”, in which the customer experience is “guaranteed” by the operator 
and discriminatory pricing can be imposed on third-party content providers through 
their contracts with the mobile operator.  
In a “walled garden”, the number of CPs is effectively regulated by their relationship 
with an ISP. “Walled gardens” may evolve so that access providers (both mobile and 
fixed) are likely to continue to offer content and services to their customers, bundled 
with BB access. These services are often provided with guaranteed QoS (e.g. IPTV 
services Sky On Demand or Homechoice). These services are not necessarily anti-
competitive if the end user can access the wider Internet and choose to consume other 
content. The critical competition issues are: 
• Access providers who provide bundled services could be motivated to degrade  
content services or applications which compete with their own portal services; 
• If they do this, they will not be incentivised to tell their customers that the QoS 
for these services is inferior; 
• They could use this to leverage payment from content and applications 
providers; 
• Access providers may agree preferential arrangements with some content or 
applications providers but not make the same terms available to others. 
It is clear that discrimination and other forms of quality control are exercisable in a 
manner which does not fully support open access to content. 
3. Quality of Service 
Content charging relies on a type of QoS for the Internet, enabling network providers 
to discriminate between packets, and potentially even content providers, to offer 
better than ‘best effort’ quality. There is an argument that the Internet should not 
develop QoS, and that therefore no filtering of packets or preferential increase in 
quality should be allowed.27 As Internet engineering has for many years pursued the 
goal of increased reliability, speed and higher bandwidth, this position is opposed by 
Clark28 and Crowcroft.29 The current ‘best effort’ Internet has flaws, as Yoo30 states:  
                                                                                                                                       
providers and presented to the end user by the access provider as a branded ‘portal’. The content or 
service can be acquired from a third party in exchange for a direct payment.  An agreement to share 
advertising revenue is an increasingly common model. The service offered by an access provider may 
restrict users to content only in that walled garden.  In this case, the access provider is a gatekeeper 
(like Vodafone Live! When it first launched). Alternatively, the access provider may give users the 
freedom to access the wider Internet and consume other content and services, including those which 
may compete with those in the portal.  In this case, he is not a gatekeeper to the Internet (like the BT 
Yahoo! model).  
27
 Wikipedia, Packet sniffer; available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Packet_sniffer  
28
 D Clark (28 February 2007) “The end-to-end argument in today's world: Do we have to destroy the 
principle to save it?” http://www.communicationsresearch.net/events/article/default.aspx?objid=1835  
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“TCP/IP routes packets anonymously on a ‘first come, first served’ 
and ‘best efforts’ basis. Thus, it is poorly suited to applications that 
are less tolerant of variations in throughput rates, such as 
streaming media and VOIP, and is biased against network-based 
security features that protect e-commerce and ward off viruses and 
spam.”  
The standards body for 3G mobile telephony, 3GPP, has been working since 2000 on 
a set of standards called IMS, for IP Multimedia Subsystem.31 This is an operator-
friendly environment intended to generate new revenue via deep packet inspection. 
Fixed-line carriers and equipment vendors have created the “IPsphere”, a new set of 
standards for network intercession in IP application flows.32 Both sets of standards 
support the ability to filter and censor by file type, and potentially content provider, 
on the Internet: in an extreme case, one could degrade all content that is not tagged as 
paying a ‘premium’ carriage fee. This enables the carrier to discriminate, to decide 
which content to delay and which to permit to travel at normal speeds to the end-user. 
As Waclawsky puts it: “This is the emerging, consensus view: That IMS will let 
broadband industry vendors and operators put a control layer and a cash register over 
the Internet and creatively charge for it.”33 Of course that also can lead to a type of 
“arms race” as P2P networks encrypt all traffic to prevent inspection, in the same way 
that firewalls on Intranets were evaded using Port:80 and other techniques.34 
Odlyzko and Levinson35 refute many of the arguments for fine-scaled charging which 
underlie the architecture of IMS, and QoS. They note that:  
“Technology appears to be making fine-scale charging (as in tolls 
on roads that depend on time of day or even on current and 
anticipated levels of congestion) increasingly feasible. Standard 
economic theory supports such measures, and technology is being 
developed and deployed to implement them. But their spread is not 
very rapid, and prospects for the future are uncertain … the case for 
fine-scale charging is not unambiguous, and in many cases may be 
inappropriate.” 
                                                                                                                                       
29
 J Crowcroft (2007) “Net Neutrality: the technical side of the debate. A white paper” (2007) 37 ACM 
SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review 1, at 49 – 56. 
http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1198255.1198263&coll=ACM&dl=ACM&idx=J101&part=news
letter&WantType=Journals&title=ACM%20SIGCOMM%20Computer%20Communication%20Revie
w&CFID=15151515&CFTOKEN=6184618  
30
 C S Yoo, “Beyond Network Neutrality” (2005) 19 (1) Harvard Journal of Law & Technology. 
31
 See J Waclawsky (2005) “IMS 101: What You Need to Know Now”, at: 
http://www.bcr.com/carriers/public_networks/ims_101_what_need_know_now_2005061514.htm  
32
 See IPSphere (2006) ‘Creating a Commercially Sustainable Framework for IP Services Realizing 
Next Generation Revenues’, IPsphere Forum Work Program Committee Version 1b.0, May, at: 
http://www.ipsphereforum.org/home/IPsphere_CommercialPrimerExec050806.pdf  
33
 Waclawsky (2005) supra. 
34
 C Pfleeger and S L Pfleeger, Security in Computing, 4th Edition, Prentice Hall Pearson, 2006. 
35
 A Odlyzko and D Levinson (2007) “Too expensive to meter: The influence of transaction costs in 
transportation and communication” http://www.dtc.umn.edu/~odlyzko/doc/metering-expensive.pdf 
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I see no obligation to take any firm position on the issue. What is important in this 
discussion is the extent of such potential discrimination, and its justification. Freiden36 
“accepts as necessary and proper many types of price and QoS discrimination” and 
attempts “an identification of best practices in “good” discrimination that should 
satisfy most network neutrality goals without creating disincentives that might 
dissuade ISPs from building the infrastructure needed.” That is also my goal, in a 
specific European context. 
3.1 Bandwidth Supply: Traffic shaping and content “throttling” 
All network owners have incentives to stop traffic flowing over their networks that is 
low value, high volume and for which it is technically unfeasible or uneconomic to 
charge – notably non-network affiliated content including user-generated and 
transmitted content. This content is very low-value to the network and, with many 
millions of users all valuing each others’ own-created Web 2.0 content, under current 
market and technological conditions there is insufficient value to charge individual 
users and thus all content may be throttled in the absence of a charging mechanism. 
Content on limited bandwidth networks can “choke” the network capacity, especially 
at peak times of usage (daytime for business, evening for consumers). In a “best 
effort” environment without congestion charging,37 that content has insufficient 
disincentives to prevent its flourishing: for instance P2P traffic and its use by early-
adopter high-volume users. ISPs can choose to filter P2P traffic of various kinds – 
typically it is unencrypted relatively crude versions of popular file-sharing 
programmes, such as BitTorrent which is used to provide upgrades to the most 
popular multiplayer online game World of Warcraft. Many assertions are made about 
the implications of certain types of traffic, but regulators currently have no basis for 
deciding if such assertions represent real problems.38  
Blocking (and other forms of traffic shaping) is controversial because, under current 
network management tools, it is a blunt tool. For instance, all P2P traffic using a 
certain protocol (e.g. BitTorrent) may be blocked. P2P can respond by encrypting its 
traffic or otherwise spoofing, but this creates an “arms race” much like that found in 
security software responses to the threat of breaches. In fact, the claims of ISPs are 
that P2P traffic contains a high proportion of malware, spam and spyware, and 
therefore it is filtered in the end-user’s interest and in conformity with the Terms of 
Use for end-users.39 Many assertions are made about the implications of certain types 
                                               
36
 R Frieden (2006), see footnote 9. 
37
 J Crowcroft “Net Neutrality: the technical side of the debate. A white paper” (2007) 37 ACM 
SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review 1, at 49 – 56. 
http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1198255.1198263&coll=ACM&dl=ACM&idx=J101&part=news
letter&WantType=Journals&title=ACM%20SIGCOMM%20Computer%20Communication%20Revie
w&CFID=15151515&CFTOKEN=6184618 
38
 Public remarks of discussion between UK and French regulators at ENST conference 29 May 2007 
in Paris. 
39
 See R Clayton “Failures in a Hybrid Content Blocking System.” Proc. 5th Workshop on Privacy 
Enhancing Technologies, Dubrovnik, May 2005, from http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/cleanfeed.pdf, 
and I Brown, “Internet censorship: be careful what you ask for.” Proc. International Conference on 
Communication, Mass Media and Culture, Istanbul, October 2006, C Pfleeger and S L Pfleeger 
Security in Computing, 4th Edition, Prentice Hall Pearson, 2006. 
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of traffic, but regulators have no basis for deciding if such assertions represent big or 
small problems. The ISP assertion that P2P traffic contains a high proportion of 
malware may be disingenuous. Email spam and web surfing are the vectors for 
malware, but the ISPs do not block such traffic.40 The ISP assertion that for instance 
BitTorrent traffic contains a high proportion of malware may be correct or 
disingenuous. Email spam and web surfing are the vectors for malware, but the ISPs 
don’t block such traffic.  
The claim made is that networks cannot be upgraded successfully given the flood of 
P2P traffic. This is by no means a universally shared sentiment amongst ISPs and I 
note recent comments attributed to Matt Beal, BT Wholesale’s chief technical officer: 
“It is up to us at the core of the network to make sure there is enough 
bandwidth”.41 He further stated BT’s Next Generation Network42 would “put enough 
[bandwidth] volume out there … so we don't have to [traffic shape]” which is “quite 
Big Brother-ish”. There is therefore no consensus as to the type and extent of traffic 
shaping and other forms of blocking and throttling P2P traffic. Where ISPs do not 
have effective Terms of Use, or do not enforce uniformly those current strategies in 
place to dissuade “unfair” use, two consequences can follow. 
1. Users are summarily terminated or suspended – this can be conducted by any 
ISP and may well be justified. This practice could be made more transparent.43  
2. ISPs choose to filter P2P traffic – typically popular file-sharing programmes.  
Some content providers (for example Google and Akamai) also invest in network 
infrastructure (called Content Delivery Networks or CDNs) that minimise the end-to-
end bandwidth required of the carrier’s network in order to improve the user 
experience, and consequently minimise the need for the carrier to invest in backbone 
and exchange capacity. The CDN stores (“caches”) content within countries and even 
networks, in order to deliver the content more efficiently and quickly than if there 
were only one global server to deliver all content. There is a research question that 
may be considered: would the introduction of QoS and discrimination enhance or 
diminish the business case for such local storage that is not on the network? More 
research is required on this topic, as it may be that NGN content discrimination could 
begin an “arms race” for local storage solutions between ISPs and CDNs. It is clear 
that such a competition would require extra resources above and beyond entry into 
content markets, and the prospects for European content development should be 
considered in the light of such potential costs. I consider it in the following section. 
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 See C Williams “Virgin throttles national cable network” 8 May, 2007, The Register, at 
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/05/08/vigin_nationwide_throttling/ 
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 D Meyer, “BT says no to traffic shaping” ZDnet, Thursday, April 12, 2007, at 
http://uk.news.yahoo.com/zdnet/20070412/ttc-bt-says-no-to-traffic-shaping-20a87fa.htm 
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 A common ITU term for all-IP networks, which are replacing the current telephony networks. 
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 Freiden sites Code Monkey Ramblings Blog “Network Neutrality”, posted May 20, 2006. 
http://www.codemonkeyramblings.com/2006/05/network_neutrality.php: “What the ISPs don't tell the 
public is that there are no free-riders among the content companies. They pay handsomely for their 
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this "Network Neutrality" controversy exists today is that ISPs don't want to admit that their whole 
business model is flawed.” 
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3.2 Supply and investment  
Most existing UK home Internet connections are already at broadband speed. There 
may be a developing supply–demand “arms race”, as connection speed and 
application bandwidth continually drive each other higher (at least in urban high-
density locations). This is obviously only one of several different potential outcomes. 
If networks and commercial content providers cannot monetise their respective parts 
of the value chain, network effects can reverse into a “vicious circle”, in which neither 
content nor network can secure investment to provide service.44 Instead, the inflexion 
points at which investment in the lagging element is needed to prime the next phase of 
disruptive growth can become crisis points. At this point, investments may be 
constrained and a “virtuous circle” of investment replaced by a vicious circle of 
under-investment. As users currently display relatively little apparent motivation to 
price-discriminate in order to gain greater bandwidth, knowing that the extra 
bandwidth is only in the ‘last mile’ and does not necessarily result in higher speeds 
for their favourite service, the incentives for end-users to signal willingness to pay for 
greater service may be weak. Again, there is an information problem, with ISPs 
unwilling to demonstrate clearly the practical advantages of advertised speeds of for 
instance “up to 8Mb/s”. This investment conundrum is claimed by some ISPs as a 
justification for traffic management and price discrimination, two of the types of 
content discrimination I discuss in the following section. 
4 Consumer and User demands for content  
4.1 Web 2.0 and Service/Content Innovation 
User-generated and distributed applications and services on the Internet are seen as 
crucial to development of the broadband economy, increasing the utility and power of 
networked computing, especially the Internet. As Commissioner Reding stated: 
“We are now living through a new disruptive phase of the Information 
Society. Some people call it Web2.0 or social networking. I can list some 
of the components: blogs, podcasts, wikis, social networking websites, 
search engines, auction websites, games, VoIP and peer-to-peer services. 
What is new about these uses of the Internet is that they exploit the 
Internet’s connectivity to support people to network and to create content. 
This is a new paradigm in which users are co-producers of services.”45 
Web 2.0, makes user-generated and distributed content central to consumers’ Internet 
experiences. This phenomenon has fundamental impacts on the value chain of 
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affected industries.46 Notable European examples are VOIP software Skype and the 
P2P client Kazaa. User experience with digital games and multimedia suggests that 
they are likely to drive innovation and adoption of Web 2.0 and P2P services and 
markets.47 Ruthless competition in these markets results in highly volatile and 
“snowballing” investment decisions: for states seeking to attract such investment, 
there is more of a “winner-takes-all” pay-off from the entrepreneurial investment 
climate provided.48 
If innovation is typically both user-distributed and user-driven, the implications are 
that innovation is encouraged by interoperability and open access: in general, ensuring 
that content can be freely shared between those users. This view is in some conflict 
with content and network owners’ desire to be recompensed for provision of local 
loop upgrades and has led to an animated debate in the United States. Note that 
content providers pay for their traffic to be carried by backbone ISPs, on a best effort 
basis, and the argument is about ISPs wishing to increase those payments as a result 
of either enhancing or blocking service, on a mandatory or opt-in basis (clearly a 
mandatory blocking service for those refusing to pay an extra toll is the most 
capricious of these possibilities, as in Madison River). 
Lemley and Lessig claim that innovation at the edge of the network is opposed by 
traditional media and network businesses, as it makes business cases based on 
controlling distribution bottlenecks redundant: where there is peer sharing, there is 
less opportunity for traditional bottlenecks and therefore control of revenues. 
However, the inverse applies also: without some means to secure revenues for the 
increased bandwidth necessary for Web 2.0 type applications to flourish, do network 
operators have an incentive to upgrade? As Whitacre of AT&T famously stated:  
“The Internet can't be free in that sense, because we and the cable 
companies have made an investment and for a Google or Yahoo! or 
Vonage or anybody to expect to use these pipes [for] free is nuts!”49  
Web 2.0 content is the most susceptible to discriminatory pricing and therefore forms 
a focus for the discussion of discrimination that follows. A goal of the European 
Commission is to encourage the development of European content providers to match 
the American success stories: “The creation of an open and competitive single market 
for online content is one of the key aims of the EU’s i2010 initiative.”50 The European 
approach to “Content Online” is to be laid out in a Communication from the European 
Commission, expected in the autumn of 2007. Therefore the European user generated 
content industry’s future entry barriers and business model are at stake in this debate, 
a fact of which the Commission and Member States are aware and which needs to be 
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 See for example B W Wirtz  “Reconfiguration of Value Chains in Converging Media and 
Communications Markets” (2001) 34 Long Range Planning, 489–506. 
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 C Marsden, J Cave, E Nason, A Parkinson, C Blackman and J Rutter, (2006) Assessing Indirect 
Impacts of the EC Proposals for Video Regulation, TR-414 for Ofcom. Santa Monica: RAND 
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94 (4) Journal of Political Economy, 822–41. 
49 Business Week International Online Extra, “At SBC, It’s All About ‘Scale and Scope’”, 7 November, 
2005 at: 
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fully considered in future policy discussions in order to take a holistic view of the 
problem. 
The questions I explore here regard the barriers to entry for European content 
providers. Would content-sharing sites develop if discriminatory content charging was 
the state of the world? Furthermore, the network effects required to make content 
successful may only be possible because content sites do not initially seek to monetize 
content: monetization is enabled because the network effect created a critical mass of 
contributors and consumers. The “next” YouTube may face disincentives to achieve 
such growth.  
4.2 The user as citizen: Internet access policy  
Many European citizens will want to use Web 2.0 services to share photographs, 
music and other user-generated content. Users whose access to Internet content is 
‘throttled’ have reportedly ‘flamed’ or sent abusive email to ISP owners. Users 
increasingly expect a level of unfiltered access to ‘free’ content on the Internet, and it 
is possible that this will be confirmed by a redefinition of access policy in the near 
future. We may expect to see more protest behaviour by ‘netizens’ who do not agree 
with a law or policy, especially where ISPs are seen to have failed to fully inform 
end-users about the implications of policy changes. Regulators (and their political 
equivalents) will not be able to ignore such problems.51 
A type of Universal Service Obligation (USO) that is upgraded as broadband network 
speeds increase can ensure a minimal open Internet layer is maintained. I do not in 
this paper take any position on whether the USO will be extended for NGNs, nor is it 
possible to do so in an environment where the future bandwidth supply/demand 
capabilities are so uncertain. However, I raise the issue – which is part of a current 
European Commission research project52 – in order to emphasise that the debate is 
broader than the question of application of competition law, and encompasses societal 
needs and consumer rights.  
5. A European approach to Net Neutrality? 
Our approach is of the “middle way” proposed by Atkinson and Weiser53 and 
Freiden.54 It neither proposes an absolute ban on price discrimination where justified 
(for example, where higher speed access to fibre links to the consumer provides an 
investment that certain high-bandwidth applications find attractive), nor an absolute 
prohibition on regulatory oversight. Instead it begins by asking which abuses are key 
to the problem in Europe. I have identified an immediate problem requiring regulatory 
oversight that is counter-intuitive: the immediate problem with Net Neutrality may 
not be so much with the dominant ISP (expressed in European debate as one having 
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Significant Market Power [SMP]),55 but with the smaller ISPs. It may be a disguised 
economic incentive problem that is first identified as a security issue. It may further 
impact relations between ISPs, in that those (typically smaller consumer) ISPs that are 
generating most spam can adversely affect the security and traffic management of 
other networks, and cause particular problems at peering points.  
There may therefore be a case for identifying the non-SMP operators as the current 
miscreants in NGN access-to-content policy. I suggested that widespread 
discriminatory behaviour can take place even where an ISP does not have SMP. 
Competition between ISPs is present in some metropolitan and suburban networks, 
but is limited by both geographical scale and feature-price scope.56 Note that where 
only retail resellers use a broadband line from the incumbent, the degree of price and 
feature competition is very small given that wholesale prices and bit-rates are set by 
the incumbent. It is therefore an easy generalisation to claim greater broadband 
competition in Europe, when for infrastructure (where real investment is made and 
real innovation in service is possible) this may not be the case either currently or in 
the near future.57 In any case, it is a very untypical, highly sophisticated and 
motivated consumer who currently is able to analyze the different bandwidth and 
throttling options and select to which provider to switch at the end of their contract. 
5.1 Watch list for regulators 
The main point that emerges from the scenario portraits is that market evolution is 
dynamic and complex. The availability and design of a suitable regulatory response 
must reflect this dynamism, and also the responsiveness of regulators and market 
players to each other. Therefore, if any legislation is required it should be future-proof 
and avoid being overly prescriptive, to avoid a premature response to the merging 
environment. Instead, I propose below that regulators equip themselves with the skills 
and evidence base to rapidly investigate potential problems of unjustified 
discrimination. Further, I note that the European legal basis for regulatory 
intervention, especially the Access and Interconnection Directive, potentially provides 
for a wider and better variety of regulatory tools to intervene than the current US 
situation.58 
Two specific issues in this “watch list” are detection of any discrimination, and the 
standing of the content providers complaining of such discrimination. Engineers 
appear unable to agree on whether QoS will be introduced in NGNs, as QoS is a very 
longstanding issue that has never been implemented with commercial success on the 
                                               
55
 See the European Commission guidelines: 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/liberalization/others/i02_1016_en.pdf  
56
 Note that of Europe’s 450m population, only a small proportion are in reach of an unbundled local 
telephone exchange, or an alternative high-speed infrastructure provider to the duopoly of cable and 
telecoms incumbents. See the EC Implementation Twelfth report of 29 March 2007 at 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/implementation_enforcement/annualreports/12t
hreport/index_en.htm or the ECTA Regulatory Scorecard: 
http://www.ectaportal.com/en/upload/File/Broadband%20Scorecards/Q306/FINALBBScQ306.xls  
57
 R Van Der Berg, “Developments In Fibre Technologies And Investment”, OECD draft, 
DSTI/ICCP/CISP 4, 3 May, 2007 OECD, Paris. 
58
 D Scott, Speech at Westminster eForum, 2007, at 
http://www.wwww.radioauthority.org.uk/media/speeches/2007/03/regulate  
(2007) 4:4 SCRIPT-ed 
 
 
422 
public Internet. However, should it be introduced, the types of harmful discrimination 
that can result may be undetectable. Blocking, as discussed in section 1, is relatively 
easy to spot. “Throttling” or choking bandwidth, even where unjustified, may be 
harder to spot and even harder to efficiently regulate. It is a moot point whether 
unjustified discrimination short of blocking is useful to an ISP, as discrimination 
against a particular content type may be overcome by sophisticated content providers 
via encryption in a technological “arms race”,59 and in order for discrimination to 
create a business case, it needs to be effective in creating substantial incentives for 
content providers to pay a premium. Though it may not be possible technically to 
identify all discrimination, the most egregious types of discrimination may only 
provide a marketing advantage if obvious enough for customers to identify the 
benefits.60 Paradigmatically, only clear discrimination may be really worthwhile for 
network operators – such that the cost-benefit is at least in theory obvious to content 
suppliers, network operators and end-users. A solution may be to require network 
operators to provide their Service Level Agreements on QoS to both content providers 
and more transparently to the end-user via a regulatory or co-regulatory reporting 
requirement.  
Regulators expecting a ‘smoking gun’ to present itself as in Madison River should be 
advised that a more proactive approach to monitoring and researching non-neutral 
behaviours will make network operators much more cognisant of their duties and 
obligations – to do so without incurring the interest of a concerned regulator may be 
hazardous. Regulators can monitor both commercial transactions and traffic shaping 
by ISPs to detect potentially abusive discrimination. The question of legal standing 
for content providers under Directives is a technical legal question that I leave open in 
this paper, but upon which there is a need for greater discussion in the European 
Regulators Group (ERG) and elsewhere.61 The European Commission has asked in 
the ERG “if discussion should not be dealing with Net Neutrality issues”.62 
If content providers cannot formally make individual complaints to regulators, it may 
be that an independent investigation into potential discrimination can be made on the 
regulator’s own initiative, depending on its constitutional and formal powers. While 
this is appropriate for a converged regulator such as UK Ofcom which regulates both 
content and carriage, it may not be the case in other European jurisdictions. Both the 
European Commission and ERG would be well-advised to consider the types of 
response regulators could make to such complaints if standing is found to be lacking. 
No matter what theoretical powers may exist, their usage in practice and the issue of 
forensic gathering of evidence may ultimately be more important. An ex ante 
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requirement to demonstrate internal network QoS metrics to content provider 
customers and consumers may therefore be a more practical solution.  
Currently, not only is it not a requirement for ISPs to notify customers when they 
block vital P2P-distributed applications, the security reasons given are outside the 
remit of typical economic telecoms regulators. This governance gap has been 
highlighted to Ofcom at the most senior levels, and is partially overcome by the 
institutional arrangements in the European Commission. Where the security reasons 
given by ISPs for blocking traffic (which they claim carries malware and other 
harmful content) is typically the concern of the Ministry of the Interior (in the UK, the 
Home Office) and occasionally the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the regulator 
defers to these senior agencies and has little technically-specific knowledge of data 
security.63 In Directorate General Information Society and Media (DG INFSO), the 
Unit that covers information security is at least in the same DG as the enforcement 
and policy units. 
Therefore, I suggest that the European NGN content problem is less a lack of 
regulatory tools per se than it is a lack of forensic skill to analyse the potential 
consumer harms that can be created by unjustified discrimination. It is important that 
governments consider where best the issue is regulated, by telecoms regulator or by 
ministry. Because Net Neutrality raises a set of new issues for regulators, the 
necessary skill set needs to be acquired and developed in consultation with other 
national and international regulators, and the European Commission. Note in this 
regard the work of the OECD, the bilateral relations with the US, and the European 
Regulators Group Convergence working group.64 
5.2 Co-regulatory solutions 
Note one critical proviso: regulation to ensure any form of Net Neutrality in Europe 
should have as light touch as possible, while maintaining effectiveness, based on three 
recourses:  
1. Information regulation, to require service providers to inform consumers about 
the choices they are making when they sign up for a service, and any relevant 
changes to the service – for instance blocking of certain services. The 
relevance of the changes is consumer-driven, and therefore full and prompt 
disclosure by companies via their website is necessary. Even if not all 
customers choose to exercise the option to monitor the situation, providing the 
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information provides transparency. It also may head off calls to helpdesks 
given that the ‘technical fault’ may actually be a change of network policy. 
2. Continually upgraded monitoring and surveillance.  
3. Where necessary investigation and timely but evidence-based intervention, to 
correct harmful and unjustified discrimination 
These regulatory interventions do, however, require regulators to impose a reporting 
burden on service providers to provide transparency in their traffic-management 
practices.65 I note that the danger of fragmentation and regulatory arbitrage is 
apparent here for two reasons: a type of “regulatory holiday” for ISPs in one country 
but not another is quite likely, and enforcement of Net Neutrality may be highly 
divergent even under the current 2002 framework. Therefore the EC as well as 
Member States will need to monitor developments in this area closely, especially in 
view of policies for ContentOnline and the wider ‘Lisbon goals’, under which the 
importance of content provision (as well as network deployment) for jobs and growth 
are emphasised.66 In particular the role of SMEs in content and service provision is 
likely to be a substantial engine for such growth. 
Notwithstanding the backstop of regulatory intervention, based on the incomplete 
evidence thus far, I suggest that Net Neutrality be primarily enforced via reporting 
requirements. This is a form which can be classed as self-regulation where there is an 
incentive on market players to cooperate, and co-regulation or formal regulation if 
there is not, in which market actors and self-regulatory bodies maintain a constant 
dialogue with regulators and consumers. This is a preferable lighter-touch regime to 
those of government-funded regulation and non-regulation of European Net 
Neutrality and a flexible and responsive framework. 
Expanding on the second recommendation, timely and evidence based intervention, I 
note that regulators will need to ensure that the network operators report more fully 
and publicly the levels of QoS that they provide between themselves as well as to 
end-users. Internet architecture experts have explained that discrimination is most 
likely to occur at this level as it is close to undetectable by those not in the two 
networks concerned in the hand-over of content.67 It is very difficult (if not 
impossible) to monitor the former for anyone other than the two network operators 
themselves, and therefore shedding light on QoS in this area will require a reporting 
requirement to be imposed. As this information is routinely collected by the network 
operators for internal purposes, this should not impose a substantial burden.  
The pace of change in the relation between architecture and content on the Internet 
requires continuous improvement in the regulator’s research and technological 
training. This is in part a reflection of the complexity of the issue set, including 
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security and Internet-peering issues, as well as more traditional telecoms and content 
issues. Dominant and entrenched market actors in regulated “bottlenecks” play games 
with regulators in order to increase the sunk costs of market entry for other actors, and 
pass through costs to consumers and innovators. Very high entry barrier co-regulation 
and self-regulation can be as effective in curbing market entry as direct content 
regulation, especially where ISPs are incentivised to tier and charge for QoS, which 
raises doubts as to their desire to implement self regulation. By and large, the greater 
the levels of regulation, the more likely the market is to develop towards more closed 
and concentrated structures, for three reasons: 
1. larger companies are able to bear compliance costs much more easily than 
SMEs, and therefore it is important that such entry barriers – where necessary 
– are minimised; 
2. larger companies have the resources and lobbying power to seek to influence 
regulation in a positive direction; 
3. large ISPs in a concentrated market may offload costs upstream onto content 
providers and developers, or downstream onto consumers.  
Therefore any solution needs to take note of the potential for larger companies to 
“game” a co-regulatory scheme and create additional compliance costs for smaller 
companies (whether content or network operators, and the combination of sectors 
makes this a particularly complex regulatory “game”). 
A group of academics and engineers have proposed rules on what can be called 
“Internet” service. Those rules might be considered a form of transparency regulation. 
Essentially they claim that any service that differentiates between packets is breaching 
the end-to-end principles of the Internet Protocol and therefore should not be labelled 
as an “Internet” service. They suggest legislative wording as follows: 
“Network providers that offer special features based on analyzing 
and identifying particular applications being conveyed by packet 
transmissions must not describe these services as "Internet" 
services. Any representation as to the speed or "bandwidth" of the 
Internet access shall be limited to the speed or bandwidth allocated 
to Internet access.”68 
I do not comment on this proposal, beyond suggesting that regulators will need to 
form a view of what access to the public Internet is required in order to make effective 
conclusions on the future for USO during the course of 2007-8. I emphasise that this 
debate is likely to grow in complexity during that period, and urge regulators to 
conduct research in this area. Unfettered Internet access of some type is a currently 
enjoyed “public good” for consumers, particularly in the use of Web 2.0-type 
applications and services, and this public sphere is a regulatory policy of continued 
consideration. 
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6 Conclusion: Regulating for end-users and innovation 
An open content model tends towards Web 2.0-type “public good” values and 
innovation concentrated in end-users rather than network operators and associated 
clusters of developers. While this is by no means the only model for Internet-based 
and ICT-oriented innovation, it is a promising new approach that Commissioner 
Reding has suggested should be encouraged. At the margin, the choices made now 
about the regulation of these sectors can have an impact on this business model 
choice, and therefore end-user benefits.  
In sum, these conclusions support a light-touch regulatory regime involving reporting 
requirements and co-regulation, with as far as is possible, market-based solutions. 
Regulatory monitoring of potential abuses, including strengthening investigatory 
capacity and transparency for end-users, is a solution which maintains maximum 
flexibility and policy choice, while ensuring that any abuses can be quickly detected 
and dealt with appropriately. Solutions may be international as well as local, and 
international coordination of best practice and knowledge through fora such as the 
ERG and OECD will enable national regulators to keep up with the technology “arms 
race”. 
Finally, note that the Commission on 14 November 2007 issued new proposed 
Directives, including network neutrality provisions, explaining that: 
In Article 21 … NRAs are given powers to require from operators 
better tariff transparency (paragraph 4) as well as clear 
information on possible restrictions on access to all types of content 
and applications (paragraph 5). The possibility for the Commission 
to take implementing measures is intended to ensure, where 
appropriate, a minimum level of harmonisation in this area 
(paragraph 6). 
In Article 20(5): this provides for a transparency mechanism 
concerning possible restrictions on end-users’ choice of lawful 
content and applications in order to empower end-users to make an 
informed choice of services, thus allowing them to reap the full 
benefits of technological developments in the Information Society. 
In Article 22: this grants to the national regulatory authorities the 
power to prevent degradation of quality of service by setting 
minimum quality levels for network transmission services for end-
users. The possibility for the Commission to take implementing 
measures is intended to ensure, where appropriate, a minimum level 
of harmonisation in this area (paragraph 3).69 
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As it explained in its Impact Assessment (Section 8.1.4 at p90),70 the European 
Commission favours harmonisation and the granting of updated rights to enforce 
minimum standards to users, rather than leaving them (as currently) in the hands of 
regulators: 
[W]hile the "net freedoms" are already embedded in the design of 
the framework, they are expressed as obligations on the 
undertakings and corresponding powers of the NRA, and not in 
relation to users' rights to ensure connectivity…. the current 
regulatory framework does not provide NRAs with the means to 
intervene were the quality of service for transmission in an IP-based 
communications environment to be degraded to unacceptably low 
levels, thereby frustrating the delivery of services from third parties. 
In such an event, end-users' connectivity to services provided on the 
Internet (TV, telephony, Internet, etc.) could be at risk. The impact 
of prioritisation or of systematic degradation of connectivity could 
be larger on services needing real-time communications (e.g. IPTV, 
VoIP, in which latency is critical) and ultimately affect end-user 
choice. 
It cites OECD (2007) as authority for this proposition and maintains that intervention 
is necessary: 
This option would address "network neutrality" and basic 
connectivity by establishing a safety net for quality of transmission: 
in case the elements of the basic connectivity would become 
seriously under threat, the NRAs could intervene by setting common 
minimum quality levels for network transmission services for end-
users, based on standards agreed at EU level. This would guarantee 
minimal level of connectivity and greater choice for consumers 
ensuring the delivery of third party services at suitably high quality 
levels appropriate to their needs. Provisions in the area of ‘net 
freedoms’ would also be made more explicit. 
Should these proposals become legislation in 2009 at European level, and therefore 
2011 at national level, they may go some way towards satisfying the concerns 
outlined in this paper with flexible regulatory responses. However, if a week is a long 
time in politics, four years is an eternity in broadband content development. 
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